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Abstract
There is often a fundamental mismatch between pro-
grammable privacy frameworks, on the one hand, and
the ever shifting privacy expectations of computer sys-
tem users, on the other hand. Based on the theory of
contextual integrity (CI) [24], our paper addresses this
problem by proposing a privacy framework that trans-
lates users’ privacy expectations (norms) into a set of ac-
tionable privacy rules that are rooted in the language of
CI. These norms are then encoded using Datalog logic
specification to develop an information system that is
able to verify whether information flows are appropriate
and the privacy of users thus preserved. A particular ben-
efit of our framework is that it can automatically adapt as
users’ privacy expectations evolve over time.
To evaluate our proposed framework, we conducted
an extensive survey involving more than 450 participants
and 1400 questions to derive a set of privacy norms in
the educational context. Based on the crowdsourced re-
sponses, we demonstrate that our framework can derive
a compact Datalog encoding of the privacy norms which
can in principle be directly used for enforcing privacy of
information flows within this context. In addition, our
framework can automatically detect logical inconsisten-
cies between individual users’ privacy expectations and
the derived privacy logic.
1 Introduction
Incorporating privacy expectations into real world sys-
tems remains an important research challenge. For
the privacy-by-design initiative [1] this calls for more
than technical rigor; it calls for the adoption of a so-
cially meaningful conception of privacy, namely, one
that meets people’s expectations, and is ethically and
legally legitimate. In the case of online information plat-
forms, where privacy must be maintained amidst com-
plicated flows among participants, and between the par-
Figure 1: A screenshot from Facebook asking users to
check their privacy policies.
ticipants and the platform, the challenge is particularly
acute [26, 20, 7]. In this regard, the account of pri-
vacy [23] as contextual integrity has been promising, in-
spiring work on formal expression of contextual infor-
mational norms, on detection of infractions, and on ap-
proaches to accountability and enforcement [9, 3, 10].
These, and other similar efforts [14] have made exten-
sive contributions to the technical field — generating
machine-readable access rules and implementing com-
plex constraints that map given rules. Building on this
body of work, our project incorporates an additional
component, namely, the discovery, articulation and veri-
fication of norms.
The framework we are developing, based on the theory
of contextual integrity, offers designers a comprehensive
form of this functionality centered on contextual infor-
mational norms. This framework not only provides tools
to implement privacy rules based on social norms, but
also to continuously update those rules according to the
fluid and ongoing evolution of privacy expectations, as
is characteristic of social norms more generally. In cases
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where the discovery of norms may not be possible, and in
systems where privacy rules are based on legal and pol-
icy documents as well as professional codes, our frame-
work meets the remaining challenge faced by designers
and requirements engineers alike, namely expressing pri-
vacy norms and implementing them as privacy rules on
the one hand, and ensuring their consistency and overall
compliance with privacy expectations, on the other hand.
The theory of contextual integrity informs the struc-
ture of our privacy rules, and our project embeds these
in a logic framework which encompasses a system for
learning norms as well as the ability to enforce them in a
system that is built on these norms. Further, these norms
are formally expressed and verified to safeguard from
privacy violations that may result from a semantic gap
between privacy norms and mechanisms that enforce the
privacy norms. The need for such functionalities is re-
flected in Figure 1, depicting Facebook’s privacy check-
up utility. Our system offers the ability to automate such
check-ups. The framework continuously functions in the
background and can track the evolution of norms.
In summary, our privacy framework makes the follow-
ing key contributions:
1. Formal expression based on the theory of pri-
vacy as CI. Our framework uses the theory to con-
textual integrity to formalize informational norms
as logical rules using three key parameters: a) actors
(senders, subjects and receivers of information, usu-
ally people or organizations); b) attributes (infor-
mation types); and c) transmission principles. (See
Section 2 for further explanation.)
2. A methodology for discovering informational
(privacy) norms through crowdsourcing We have
developed an approach to identifying contextual pri-
vacy norms based on the ”wisdom of the crowds,”
in this case, the collective input from system users/-
participants.
3. Converting crowd-sourced responses to a corre-
sponding privacy logic. To derive a functional pri-
vacy logic, our system encodes structured informa-
tional norms discovered through the crowdsourc-
ing methodology using the Datalog declarative lan-
guage.
4. Verification of privacy norms. Our framework is
designed to support formal verification of the de-
rived privacy logic. Specifically, we were able to
verify for consistency of flows described by the
logic including checking the consistency of transi-
tive flows.
The paper is organized as follows: Next section pro-
vides a brief overview of the CI theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes our framework design. Section 4 dis-
cusses how we represent and evaluate CI norms in Dat-
alog, while verifying additional high-level properties us-
ing the theorem prover Z3 [11]. We also describe our
crowdsourcing methods in this section. We provide de-
tails on the evaluation in Section 5 and reflect on our
results in Section 6. Finally, in Sections 7 and 8 we de-
scribe related works and then conclude the paper.
2 Contextual Integrity Primer
The theory of contextual integrity (CI) postulates that in-
formational privacy is not all about secrecy (blocking in-
formation) [25] or control [33] but about the appropriate-
ness of information flow within a particular context. Ap-
propriateness of flow means flow that is compliant with
contextual norms governing informational flows. To ex-
press an informational norm one must specify key pa-
rameters: actors (senders, recipients and subjects), at-
tributes (the type of information at hand) and transmis-
sion principles (the constraints imposed on a particular
information flow). Taken together, these components
constitute context-relative informational norms. For in-
stance, in the health context, the patient, acting in his
capacity as both the sender and subject of an information
flow, could be telling his doctor, the recipient, about his
health issues, the attribute. The information flow would
be constrained by the transmission principle of confiden-
tiality, which restricts the onward flow of this informa-
tion to other parties. Exchange the doctor for a friend,
and the transmission principle might be reciprocity in-
stead, since friends tend to expect to hear about each
other’s problems. A patient, by contrast, does not expect
to hear about the health issues of his doctor. This is be-
cause the context of health and the context of friendship
have different overarching goals: the doctor is there to
promote the patient’s health; friends are there to support
each other. An informational norm is breached when an
action or practice disrupts the actors, attributes, or trans-
mission principles within a given information flow. Con-
textual integrity “is preserved when informational norms
are respected and violated when informational norms are
breached” [22]. In legal deliberations about privacy, the
same intuition is captured by the concept of “reasonable
expectation of privacy” [30].
It is worth emphasizing one of the most fundamental
aspects of CI, namely that, in order to determine whether
or not information flows respect or violate privacy expec-
tations within a given context, one must address all three
parameters: actors, information types, and transmission
principles. Omitting any one of them may lead to an in-
conclusive or ambiguous description. Accordingly, any
formal rendering of information flows, for the purpose
of assessing their appropriateness, needs to include inde-
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Figure 2: Our framework is designed to support several
system states. The overall operation consists of 1) gener-
ating questions that correspond to information flows, 2)
asking the questions, 3) deriving insights from the an-
swers, 4) deciding on which set of actionable privacy
rules (APR) to enforce, 5) generating questions from the
enforced norms, 6) repeating by returning to step 2.
pendent variables for these parameters.
CI recognizes that informational norms, like other so-
cial norms, are constantly evolving. Sometimes, changes
in a sociotechnical environment, such as the ones we are
experiencing in this “digital age”, can be quite rapid. Al-
though the theory of CI has a prima facie preference for
entrenched informational norms, it also allows for nor-
mative transformations when the resultant norms can bet-
ter promote the values, goals, and ends of a given con-
text. People learn and adopt implicit and explicit infor-
mational norms from their families, friends, and com-
munities; by watching how people behave and how they
react to other people’s behavior; from educational train-
ing, the arts, and cultural activities; from the study of law
and policy, and so forth.
Designing a system that translates contextual informa-
tional norms into privacy rules must either depend on a
range of legitimate external sources of knowledge (e.g.
social scientists, ethicists, law, professional codes, etc.),
or must incorporate, internally, some form of norm dis-
covery functionality.
Our project has adopted CI as our underlying conception
of privacy. There is sufficient regard for it in the privacy
community to consider this reasonably uncontroversial.
However, readers who are interested in learning about
its underlying rationale as well as its policy applications,
might wish to consult the relevant literature [22, 31]. In
Section 7, we describe related research that pursues sim-
ilar ends utilizing alternative conceptions.
3 CI-based Privacy Framework
The key components of our CI-based privacy framework
is described in Figure 2. Our framework is adaptable to
a range of information systems and platforms. We have
conceived it as an independent service that can be inte-
grated into the functionality of these respective platforms
and systems. Our CI-based framework takes as input
a simple state space description of a domain based on
the contextual integrity definitions. Specifically, this im-
plies, the input includes the list of actors, subjects, infor-
mation types and transmission principles that are relevant
to the domain of interest. In addition, the domain specific
input parameters may also provide information about the
importance of specific attributes and subjects that cor-
respond to common information flows in the domain to
guide the privacy logic generation process. Given the do-
main specific input, our framework performs three key
steps:
Norm discovery through crowdsourcing. The Ques-
tion Generation (QG) stage takes as input only
the list of parameters associated with a context,
including the list of actors, information types,
and transmission principles. The QG generates
questions from the prevailing set of privacy norms
which cover the common information flows.
These questions are crowdsourced to a set of
users who provide a simple “Yes/No/Irrelevant”
response for each question. Based on the users’
collective responses, the framework will derive the
corresponding norms.
Learning and Encoding the Privacy logic. At the
Learning stage, the answers to the questions are
analyzed to learn users’ privacy expectations. Here,
we are specifically learning a collective notion of
privacy expectation within a domain based on a
consensus metric defined on the individual user
responses to each question. Next, at the Encoding
stage, the norms reflected by the answers to each
question are encoded into a set of actionable privacy
rules using Datalog: they form the logic behind
the users’ privacy expectation. The logic is passed
on to the System state which is responsible for
privacy norm verification and enforcement based
on internal configurations, which may or may not
take users’ perception logic into account.
Verification. All of the information flows that form part
of the system are governed by privacy rules. Using
the Datalog encoding, the system evaluates every
information flow against the prevailing set of pri-
vacy rules. Furthermore, the system is capable of
verifying other meta-assertions for the derived pri-
vacy logic, including validating that the enforced
norms are consistent and disapproved information
flows are impermissible.
In addition, the framework is designed to support
learning of constantly evolving norms; as it traverses
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through states, new norms are introduced and old ones
are re-evaluated.
3.1 An example: the educational context
As a case study, we chose to apply our framework to the
educational context, since this is the context with which
we have the most familiarity; the discussion, however,
can easily be extended to other contexts. We outline a
specific example of actors, information types and trans-
mission principles in the educational context below:
Actors (Senders, Recipients, Subjects): Students,
Professors, TAs, Registrar, University IT staff,
academic advisor
Examples of Attributes: Grades, Transcript, Name,
Email address, Address, Record of attendance,
Level of participation in class, Photo, Library
records, Contents posted on online learning systems
(e.g., Blackboard, Classes, etc.), term paper
Example Transmission principles:
Knowledge: If the 〈 sender 〉 let the 〈 subject 〉
know
Permission: If the 〈 sender 〉 asked for the 〈 sub-
ject’s 〉 permission
Breach of contract: If the 〈 subject 〉 is performing
below a certain standard
We elaborate upon this example in Section 4.4 in
greater detail to show how to automatically design the
question generator given a state space description.
4 Verifiable and Actionable Privacy Rules
In this section, we first describe the encoding and verifi-
cation of the privacy logic and then proceed to describing
the procedure behind the crowdsourcing of norms.
4.1 Representation and verified enforce-
ment
We use the declarative programming language Data-
log [8] to formally represent contexts, for evaluating the
privacy rules in these contexts, and for automating crit-
ical aspects of the crowdsourced learning component.
Datalog is a well-studied language and formalism that
has found numerous applications, including the analysis
of social networks [29] and as a language for expressing
privacy and security policies (see, e.g., [12, 18, 4]).
Our main motivation for building our formalization on
Datalog can be summarized as follows:
• The encoding of contextual privacy rules to Data-
log is elegant and easily understandable. In partic-
ular, we can leverage Datalog’s query mechanism
to automatically evaluate and check the properties
of privacy norms in concrete contexts. We provide
several examples below.
• Datalog forms a fragment of first-order predicate
logic. Hence, the language’s semantics are well un-
derstood. In particular, this allows us to use pow-
erful first-order theorem provers to automatically
prove high-level privacy properties of the norms that
we learn for a specific context.
• Datalog provides a good trade-off between expres-
siveness and complexity. In particular, Datalog’s
computational model is not Turing complete, which
means that all queries are guaranteed to terminate.
We mostly restrict ourselves to a specific fragment
of Datalog referred to as unions of conjunctive
queries. This fragment is well-studied in the AI,
logic programming, and database communities. In
particular, efficient algorithms for its treatment have
already been developed [13].
4.2 Encoding Contextual Privacy in Data-
log
Datalog is a fragment of the logical programming lan-
guage Prolog. A Datalog program consists of clauses
that define predicates on entities. Our Datalog encod-
ing of contextual privacy specifies predicates on entities
that stand for contexts, actors, attributes, and transmis-
sion principles as described in Section 3. Central to the
encoding is the predicate.
allowed(Ctx, Sndr, Recp, Subj, Attr, Tr)
This predicate models that in context Ctx, actor Sndr
is allowed to send information on attribute Attr of ac-
tor Subj to actor Recp under transmission principle
Tr. For example, the following fact states that in the
classroom context (denoted by class), bob can send
his own grade to alice with transmission principle
confidentiality.
allowed(class, bob, alice, bob, grade,
confidentiality).
In order to be able to express the privacy rules, we in-
troduce a ternary predicate inrole(Context, Actor,
Role), which models that in the given context, the given
actor is in the specified role. For example, the following
fact states that in the classroom context, bob is in the role
of student
inrole(class, bob, student).
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The predicate allowed captures the rules of all pri-
vacy contexts. The individual rules for each context are
stated using clauses that contain the predicate allowed
in the head. As an example, the following clause codifies
the rule that professors can let any student know her own
grade upon her request:
allowed(class, Sndr, Recp, Subj, grade,
need) :-
inrole(class, Sndr, professor),
inrole(class, Recp, student),
Subj = Recp.
Note the close correspondence between this clause and
the shape of the survey questions discussed in Section 3.
A Datalog program is executed by evaluating a query
that asks whether a certain conjunction of predicates
holds true according to the clauses in the program. Sup-
pose that in our social platform we have a classroom con-
text whose actors are described by the following facts:
inrole(class, bob, student).
inrole(class, alice, student).
inrole(class, steve, professor).
Then we can use the query mechanism to check whether
a specific information flow satisfies all the specified pri-
vacy rules. For instance, given the above privacy rule and
facts, the query
?- allowed(class, steve, bob, bob, grade,
need).
evaluates to true, indicating that the corresponding in-
formation flow is admissible. On the other hand, the
query
?- allowed(class, steve, alice, bob,
grade, need).
evaluates to false, indicating that this flow is not per-
mitted.
4.3 Privacy logic verification
Datalog allows us to formally specify CI rules in a declar-
ative manner. In particular, we can use the query mech-
anism of a Datalog interpreter to check that all informa-
tion flows in a social platform are consistent with the
specified rules. The semantics of Datalog guarantees that
no norm-violating flows will be permitted at run-time.
The fact that Datalog provides a formally defined seman-
tics for CI rules has another important advantage: it en-
ables us to verify that the rules of a given context satisfy
desirable high-level privacy properties that are not im-
mediately evident from the rules. For example, we may
want to verify that our rules do not permit the flow of
confidential information to third parties. We can check
such properties statically before the rules are in effect.
One specific application of formal verification in our
proposed crowd-sourced learning approach is that we can
check whether the rules that have been approved by the
crowd are not violating the rules that have been disap-
proved. In particular, we can leverage formal verifica-
tion to facilitate the automatic adjustment of the thresh-
old that determines which rules are considered to be ap-
proved. In the following, we describe in more detail how
such static verification tasks can be automated.
The problem of verifying that a given set of rules R
satisfies a given property P amounts to checking logical
validity of the implicationR⇒P, or dually, that the con-
junctionR∧¬P is unsatisfiable. For simple properties P,
the latter can be checked directly using Datalog queries.
However, in general, Datalog queries are not sufficiently
expressive to verify complex high-level properties. For-
tunately, we can embed Datalog in a more expressive
logic that is still amenable to automated reasoning and
yields tractable performance for the static verification of
high-level properties in practice.
Datalog is a fragment of first-order predicate logic.
Specifically, suppose we are given a set of rules R =
{R1, . . . ,Rn} where each rule Ri is specified by a Datalog
clause of the form
allowed(C,Sn,R,Su,A,T) :-Ci,1, . . . ,Ci,mi .
and the atoms Ci, j are either in role predicates over the
given variables in the head of the clause or equalities be-
tween these variables and constants such as student,
grade, etc. Then the semantics of these clauses is cap-
tured by the following quantified formula:
∀C,Sn,R,Su,A,T.
allowed(C,Sn,R,Su,A,T)⇔
(C1,1∧·· ·∧C1,m1)∨·· ·∨ (Cn,1∧·· ·∧Cn,mn)
This formula falls into Effective Propositional Logic
(EPR), a decidable fragment of first-order predicate
logic [5]. Several automated theorem provers implement
decision procedures for EPR, e.g., the Satisfiability Mod-
ulo Theories solver Z3 [11]. If the privacy property P
of interest is itself expressible in EPR, then we can use
Z3 to automatically check that the rules R guarantee P.
Fortunately, many properties of interest are indeed ex-
pressible in EPR. For example, the following EPR for-
mula expresses that in the classroom context, a professor
should not be allowed to send a student’s grade to any
other student, unless that other student is a TA:
∀Sn,R,Su,T.
in role(Sn,professor)∧in role(R,student)∧
allowed(Sn,R,Su,grade,T )⇒
Su = R∨in role(R,TA)
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Sender: Professor Recipient: TA
Attribute: Grades
Subject: Student
Transmission principle: 
With the requirement of confidentiality
Figure 3: Information norm: The professors is allowed
to share the student’s grade with the student’s TA with
the requirement of confidentiality.
Note that this property cannot be checked with a sim-
ple Datalog query. We need the additional expressive-
ness provided by EPR. More generally, EPR can ex-
press properties about transitive information flows that
involve arbitrarily long sequences of information ex-
changes. Since the satisfiability problem for EPR is de-
cidable, we can verify these properties fully automati-
cally using tools such as Z3. In particular, if a speci-
fied property is not guaranteed by the rules, the theorem
prover will produce a model describing an information
flow that respects the rules but violates the property. Us-
ing this model, we can then identify the rules that are
responsible for this property violation.
4.4 Crowdsourcing privacy rules
In this section we describe the procedure for constructing
questions from CI norms. Users are provided with a se-
ries of multiple-choice questions; each possible answer
corresponds to a different information flow. This allows
us to establish a baseline for users’ expected privacy pref-
erences. To simulate this process, we relied on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT), as we describe in Section 5.
4.4.1 Constructing questions
As depicted by the example in Figure 3, CI norms con-
tain the following elements: actors (senders, subjects
and recipients), attributes (information types), and trans-
mission principles (constraints on flow). Below are some
examples of their possible values. We should note that
this is not a comprehensive set of values. Rather, we use
this preliminary set to bootstrap the system. We discuss
how new attribute values can be added in the next Sec-
tion.
Senders: Professors, TAs, Registrar, University librari-
ans, University IT staff, classmates, academic advi-
sor
Subjects: Student
Recipients: Professors, TAs, Registrar, University li-
brarians, University IT staff, Department chair,
Classmates, Parents, Academic advisor
Attributes: Grades, Transcript, Name, Email address,
Address, Record of attendance, Level of partici-
pation in class, Photo, Library records, Contents
posted on online learning systems (e.g., Black-
board, Classes, etc.), term paper
Transmission principles:
Confidentiality: With the requirement of confi-
dentiality
Knowledge: If the 〈 sender 〉 let the student know
Permission: If the 〈 sender 〉 asked for the student’s
permission
Purpose: To improve the learning experience
Breach of contract: If the student is performing
below a B- standard
Need: If requested by the 〈 recipient 〉
Note that, as a theoretical framework, CI does not
mandate any particular implementation. Although the
resulting 5-tuple is a conventional way of representing
different information flows, it can be extended to include
additional elements (e.g., by introducing the context ele-
ment in our encoding) to fully encompass the expressive
reality. For the sake of simplicity we rely on the 5-tuple
format for now. We inject each of the elements into the
following Yes-or-No question template:
“Is it acceptable for the 〈sender〉 to share the 〈subject〉’s
〈attribute〉 with 〈recipient〉〈transmission principle〉?”
From the answers to the crowdsourced questions we
extracted a truth table describing the information flows
that are admissible in this context. The admissibility is
determined by a rank-threshold which is set in the sys-
tem configurations. The learned truth table represents a
formal specification of the contextual privacy norms.
Note that during question generation we do not enu-
merate the full space of all possible privacy norms that
can be expressed over the given parameter values. In-
stead, we rely on the input of a privacy expert to reduce
the explored space to those candidate norms that cover
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the bulk of the relevant information flows. For the edu-
cational context, expert knowledge enabled us to reduce
the relevant space from an initial 28 thousand questions
to only 1411.
4.4.2 Introduction of new norms
The crowdsourced set of privacy norms will vary depend-
ing on the initial input; however, for the system to evolve
(i.e., in order for it to be able to introduce new privacy
rules) it needs to be able to adapt to information flows
that have not previously been entered into the system.
We envision the system to evolve in the following man-
ner:
User input. In order to adapt to new information flows,
and to be able to develop rules that correspond to
them, users will in some cases be able to “edit” their
answer to a particular question, or even the question
itself. For example, the transmission principle can
be used to indicate a new actor, e.g., “With the per-
mission of the [NEW ACTOR]”, so a question can be
displayed as follows: “Is it acceptable for the stu-
dent’s professor to share the student’s grades with
the student’s TA with permission of the [NEW AC-
TOR]?” Users will be able to either choose from
a selection of preexisting actors or to introduce a
new actor to the system. Answer options that corre-
spond to “Does not make sense” will weed out spam
lows. Other CI attributes, such as Subject, Sender,
Receiver, etc., can be introduced in a similar fash-
ion.
Expert input. As an alternative or supplementary ap-
proach to the crowd-sourced one, new actors could
also be introduced by designated domain experts.
Experts periodically decide, based on external fac-
tors, which new actors/attributes should be intro-
duced in to the system.
Both approaches can be used in combination, in a
curation-type mode. The expert could check the inputs
from users to make sure they are relevant to a given con-
text.
Ultimately, privacy rules corresponding to new ele-
ments will trigger the generation of new corresponding
questions which will be presented to the users for rank-
ing.
5 Evaluation
In our experiments we aim to evaluate the following
components:
• How the metrics we propose can serve as indica-
tors of the state of norms that have already been
approved and whether users are satisfied with the
socially derived Actionable Privacy Rule (APR) set
• Test our automatic verification approach for consis-
tency of the derived privacy logic
5.1 Simulation design
For the purpose of this simulation, we took the edu-
cational context as an example to test whether the CI
framework would be able to better encapsulate users’
privacy expectations. We constructed a context-specific
set of questions that would allow us to crowdsource
corresponding informational norms. Our target popu-
lation was US residents, between 18-26 years of age,
and currently enrolled in (or graduated within the past
three years from) an institution of higher education in
the United States. We posed these questions using an on-
line survey designed with Qualtrics and administered on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
We used a script to generate the initial set of norms
based on the most common CI parameters in a classroom
setting (e.g., teachers and students as actors; grades as
attribute; knowledge or consent as transmission princi-
ples). To decrease the total number of questions asked,
two of the authors performed a preliminary scan of the
norms to identify the ones that clearly did not make any
sense. Rather than manually going through the questions
one by one, the authors focused exclusively on valid pairs
of senders and attributes. From experts’ feedback, we in-
troduced some restrictions to remove questions that are
blatantly nonsensical (e.g., university librarians cannot
be senders of content posted on online learning systems).
Following these restrictions, we ended up with a total of
1411 questions. We randomized the questions and di-
vided them up into 15 sets (12 with 88 questions, 3 with
89 questions) with about 30 respondents each. That way,
we would be able to ask all possible questions within this
context (i.e., achieve completeness) at a reasonable cost
($2 per user per survey, plus AMT fees).
Some of the remaining questions, while perhaps valid,
are not applicable in the real world and thus make lit-
tle sense to the survey participants (e.g., it might be un-
likely for certain senders to have access to certain at-
tributes). We therefore provided users with three differ-
ent answer options that suggest nonsense (i.e., “Does not
make sense” (DMS) questions):
1) The sender is unlikely to have the information
2) The receiver would already have the information
3) The question is ambiguous.
In total, we had 451 respondents to the 15 surveys:
each user had to respond to 88-89 questions, with 28-
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32 respondents per question in each survey. The average
completion time per user and survey was around 14 min-
utes.
5.2 Approximation of Users’ Privacy Ex-
pectations
In this section we look at the pulse functionality of the
framework. We introduce a number of indicators that
together allow us to construct an estimate of the users’
overall attitude towards the existing set of privacy norms.
Specifically, we considered three metrics in our evalua-
tion: the norm approval score, the user approval score
and the divergence score.
Norm approval score (NA) Our most important met-
ric is the norm approval score (NA). This is our measure
of what question is approved by the community for the
operational privacy-rule set. We define the NA score of
question i as follows:
NAi =
∑mj=1 Yi, j
∑mj=1 (Yi, j +Ni, j +DMSi, j)
=
∑mj=1 Yi, j
m
(1)
Here, Yi, j is defined to be 1 iff respondent j answered
“Yes” to question i. Similarly, Ni, j and DMSi, j indicate
whether user j answered “No”, respectively, chose “Does
not make sense”. Thus, NAi is the ratio between the total
number of “Yes” answers and the number of all answers
for question i across all m respondents. A norm is con-
sidered approved if its NA exceeds a certain threshold,
e.g., a simple majority (> 50%).
User approval score (UA) This metric measures the
relative number of norms that have been approved by a
given respondent. Formally, the value UA j for respon-
dent j is defined as
UA j =
∑ni=1 Yi, j
∑ni=1 (Yi, j +Ni, j +DMSi, j)
=
∑ni=1 Yi, j
n
(2)
where n is the total number of questions in the survey
that j responded to.
Divergence score (DS) This metric looks at how the
answers of individual respondents vary from the norms
that have been approved and disapproved by the whole
community subject to a given NA threshold. Intuitively,
it quantifies how dissatisfied a user is with the extracted
set of operational norms. Formally, the divergence score
DS j of respondent j is defined as
DS j =
n
∑
i=1
ci⊕ui, j (3)
Yes No Total
NA > 50 315 645 960 (68%)
NA ≥ 66 115 300 415 (29%)
Yes = No 36 (2.6%)
Table 1: Summary of approved and disapproved norms
across the surveys.
Here, the bit ui, j is defined to be 1 iff respondent j ap-
proved the norm described by question i and ci is defined
to be 1 iff the community as a whole approved the norm.
Hence, DS j indicates the number of times respondent j’s
expectations differed from the operational privacy rule
set that was enforced based on the chosen NA threshold.
5.2.1 Summary of crowdsourced data
We summarize relevant results in Table 1. The number
behind the “Yes” and “No” columns reflects questions
exceeding the respective NA thresholds. In 36 questions,
the respondents could not reach any agreement because
the number of “Yes” and “No” answers was identical.
Although this is a small percentage of the total number
of questions, it highlights an important point: some in-
formation flows require closer attention; if this is the case
our design allows individuals to select norms according
to their personal preferences and identify points of con-
tention through formal verification techniques.
5.2.2 Norm approval thresholds
Next, we analyzed the different NA thresholds and how
these threshold choices affect the users’ approval and di-
vergence scores. We focused first on the two thresholds
of 50% and 66%. Figure 4 depicts two boxplots for all
users across all questions for the two NA thresholds.
Both populations look very similar. To verify the differ-
ence in means of these two population we ran a one-way
ANOVA to test a null hypothesis that there is no differ-
ence between the populations of means under different
thresholds. We can reject the null hypothesis with signif-
icance level p = 0.000165 (p< 0.05). A Tukey HSD test
identified that using the 66% threshold increases the DS
score by 4.8%.
In other words, this shows that the 66% threshold re-
sults in a higher disapproval among users with regards to
their expressed privacy expectations.
5.2.3 How satisfied are users with the set of chosen
norms?
Figure 8 depicts a scatter plot that shows the number of
users with the same DS score across all the questions
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Figure 4: Divergence Score for 50% and 66% NA
thresholds: depicts how individual users’ DS varies
with the respective NA threshold values.
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Figure 5: Total DS across all possible thresholds: for
each NA threshold we calculated and aggregated the
DS score for each of the users. The final number was
normalized by the number of the users.
for an NA threshold of 66%. The plot indicates a large
concentration of respondents with a relatively small DS.
This means that, overall, the users in our polls are satis-
fied with the operational privacy rule set chosen by the
system for this specific NA threshold.
Furthermore, to understand how the DS varies across
all the different thresholds, we calculated a combined DS
for all possible NA thresholds (0% to 100%) and normal-
ized it by the number of total users that had taken the sur-
vey. The normalization provides us with the combined
DS score of all users per threshold. Our results, depicted
by Figure 5, show that when the threshold is at its mini-
mum, DS is at the maximum. Recall that DS represents
the level of dissatisfaction of users. We can therefore in-
terpret this result as follows: when the threshold is low,
more questions are approved, meaning that a significant
number of privacy rules that users prefer to disapprove
are included in the operational set. The lowest DS val-
ues are in the 40% to 60% NA threshold range. The best
candidates for an actual threshold choice, for this specific
population based on their feedback, therefore seem to lie
in that range. Interestingly, the DS converges around the
35 mark from 66% to 100%. This shows that, in our
polls, more people opt to disapprove norms than approve
them.
5.2.4 Individual privacy expectations vs Social
norms
Figure 6 shows that there is a linear relationship between
UA and DS for the individual users for a 66% NA thresh-
old. Linear regression analysis confirms this (r2 = 0.87,
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Figure 8: Scatter plot for divergence score
formula: DS = 0.69∗UA+2.044). The 66% NA thresh-
old makes it hard to approve privacy rules; users with a
very high UA score will often be disappointed, thus hav-
ing higher DS. Conversely, users that have a lower UA
are more likely to agree with the community rules. We
can observe a similar pattern with an NA threshold of
50% on Figure 7; however, relative to the 66% threshold,
user satisfaction is slightly higher as more privacy rules
are approved on average.
5.3 Verification of extracted rules
Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of formal verifi-
cation technology to analyze the consistency of the de-
rived privacy logic. We used the theorem prover Z3 to
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Figure 6: Scatter plot of Users’ Approval and Diver-
gence Score for each user for NA threshold 66%.
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Figure 7: Scatter plot of Users’ Approval and Diver-
gence Score for each user for NA threshold 50%.
check whether the crowdsourced rules guarantee certain
privacy properties by encoding both the rules and the
properties into an Effectively Propositional Logic (EPR)
as described in Section 4.3. Specifically, our goal was
to assess whether we can use Z3 to automatically check
the consistency between the rules that we derived from
the crowd-sourced data for a chosen threshold, on the
one hand, and to check for consistency violations, on the
other hand. We focused our attention on two specific
consistency properties:
1. Semantic consistency rules. This property speci-
fies that the information flow of each disapproved norm
is indeed excluded from the flows that are allowed ac-
cording to all approved norms. Note that this property
is not trivially satisfied as the approved and disapproved
norms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In partic-
ular, the roles of a context are not guaranteed to be dis-
joint, e.g., an actor in the classroom context may be both
a department chair and a professor. Thus, we may have
situations where a specific flow is approved if the sender
is a professor but disapproved if the sender is a depart-
ment chair. Such inconsistencies hint at hidden assump-
tions of the survey participants that are not adequately
reflected by the formal privacy rules. Our verification
approach allows us to detect such inconsistencies and
subsequently eliminate them by refining the formal rule
model and the survey questions appropriately.
2. Consistency of transitive flows. This property
specifies that the approved norms are transitively closed.
For example, if a professor is allowed to send the grade
of a student to the registrar and, in turn, the registrar is
allowed to send the grade to a graduate school to which
the student has applied, then the professor should be al-
lowed to send the grade directly to the graduate school.
A violation of the transitivity property hints at a possi-
ble mismatch between the survey participants’ privacy
expectations and the logical implications of their indi-
vidual choices regarding which privacy norms should be
approved. Using our verification approach, we are able to
detect such violations (respectively, prove their absence)
for arbitrarily long sequences of information flows.
In the following, we describe the experiments we con-
ducted to check for each of these two properties as ap-
plied to the set of norms that we derived from our survey
data. Note that in both experiments the entire verification
process including the norm extraction, the logical encod-
ing of the norms and properties, and their verification,
was fully automated.
All the experiments were run on a laptop computer
equipped with an Intel Core I5 CPU at 2.67GHz and 4GB
RAM running Ubuntu Linux. The running time for each
of our experiments was less than 5 seconds. The memory
consumption was negligible.
5.3.1 Detecting semantic inconsistencies of norms
For our experiment, to detect semantic norm inconsis-
tencies we chose the 50% threshold to determine which
norms are approved according to the crowd-sourced sur-
vey data. For this threshold, as depicted by Table 1, 315
of our total 1411 norms were approved. We then en-
coded these approved norms into an EPR formula and
used Z3 to check for each of the 1096 remaining dis-
approved norms whether the corresponding information
flow was indeed prevented by the approved rules. Each
disapproved norm was checked by sending a separate sat-
isfiability query to Z3.
Intuitively, semantic norm inconsistencies can only
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arise if an agent takes on more than one role in a con-
text at the same time. We confirmed this intuition by
conducting an experiment where we verified the absence
of inconsistencies under the assumption that all roles are
pairwise disjoint. Indeed, under this assumption we were
able to prove that 100% of the disapproved norms were
consistent with the rules for the approved norms.
To detect actual semantic norm inconsistencies, we
considered a model that took the relationships between
the different roles in a classroom context into account.
For example, a TA may also be a student and a de-
partment chair is always a professor. With the realis-
tic model, we detected that 138 of the 1096 disapproved
norms were not ensured by the approved norms. For ex-
ample, one of the violated disapproved norms pertained
to a professor sharing a student’s test result with other
students. Such an information flow was permitted by
one of the approved norms, which allowed a professor
to share a test result with a TA. Since a TA may also be a
student, the disapproved norm was indeed violated.
There are a number of possible ways in which such
violations could be resolved (e.g., by refining the pri-
vacy rules or domain ontology). These are outside the
scope of this paper. The focus of our experiment was
to demonstrate that we can automatically detect all such
violations, or alternatively prove their absence.
5.3.2 Detecting inconsistencies in transitive flows
The final experiment was designed to check for incon-
sistencies due to transitive flows. Similar to the previous
experiment we encoded the logic into an EPR formula
and used Z3 to check for any violations of the transitiv-
ity property. The transitivity property involves reason-
ing about arbitrarily long chains of information flows.
This means that for a specific set of approved norms, the
number of concrete chains of information flows that are
consistent with the rules but violate transitivity may be
infinite. However, we observed that for any specific vi-
olation, there always exists a similar violation involving
a chain of bounded length. This means that all transi-
tivity violations can be classified by a finite set of small
violations. This observation allowed us to exhaustively
enumerate all types of transitivity violations for a given
set of approved rules. To do so, we used Z3’s model gen-
eration capability to generate models that witness a small
violation of transitivity.
For the 66% threshold, where 115 of our total 1411
norms were approved, we automatically detected 59 tran-
sitivity violations. On closer inspection, we found that
one such violation was the result of the following two
approved norms:
1. A TA is allowed to send information about a stu-
dent’s attendance to a professor if the student is per-
forming poorly.
2. A professor is allowed to send information about a
student’s attendance to the department chair if the
student is performing poorly.
However, a TA was not allowed to send the attendance
information directly to the department chair, leading to a
violation of transitivity. The approval rate of this rejected
norm was only 17%. Contrasted with the high approval
rates of more than 66% for the two approved norms in-
volved in the above transitive flow, this discrepancy hints
at a possible violation of the actual privacy expectations
of the users.
6 Discussion
Broader applicability: We note that we only discussed
our framework in a specific case of an educational con-
text. In principle, the same approach can easily be ap-
plied for other context definitions or a much broader/-
expanded set of actors, attributes or transmission princi-
ples. In addition, the same methodology can be applied
in an incremental fashion when new actors or new at-
tributes or new transmission principles are added to the
context definition.
Choosing real users in practice: When applying the
CI-based framework in a real-world social platform, we
envision that the questions generated by the framework
for a given context will be answered by the users of the
same platform within the same context. For example,
consider a set of users who are within a given community
in an online social platform. In our evaluations, we used
AMT to primarily simulate the responses of actual sys-
tem users. Although previous research [19, 21, 15] pro-
vides an early affirmation of the effectiveness of crowd-
sourcing tools, suggesting that large-scale surveys can
indeed be effective for discovering norms, we interpreted
our survey only as an approximation of the kinds of feed-
back we would receive in a mature system with actual
users. We would also like to emphasize that, in an op-
erational system, users would only have to respond to a
significantly reduced number of questions. Finally, AMT
does not allow us to test cases in which new norms are
introduced, as described in Section 4.4.2. We aim to ad-
dress this issue in future work.
Privacy logic. We acknowledge that technical systems
usually embody an idea of what privacy is, whether this
is merely implicit in the design or stated explicitly in the-
oretical terms, as we have done. The sources of such
ideas may be varied: the intuitions of a design team, law
and other regulatory systems, privacy experts, etc. We
do not take issue with these sources. However, the ap-
proach we take, we believe, is particularly well suited
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for information systems involving diverse social actors
interacting with one another through complex patterns of
communication (or flows) of information.
Verification. The encoding into EPR and subsequent
verification is fully automated. Our approach differs
from prior work in that our encoding of norms and prop-
erties remains within a decidable logic that admits prac-
tical decision procedures. In particular, this means that
a failed verification attempt is always due to an actual
property violation (as opposed to an incompleteness in
the verification approach). What is more, if verification
fails, the theorem prover creates a model from which a
violating information flow can be extracted. This enables
the automated diagnosis of inconsistent norms, which
can in turn be used to automate a feedback loop in the
crowdsourced norm generation.
7 Related Work
In this section we acknowledge important prior and ad-
jacent work that is related to ours. This roughly falls
into four different categories: a) Other Access Con-
trol (AC) frameworks; b) Other efforts adopting the
CI framework for building privacy-preserving systems;
c) Other compliance-based approaches to privacy-by-
design (PbD); d) Other efforts utilizing crowd-sourcing
to promote system privacy.
Other AC frameworks. Many other frameworks have
been designed to manage access control to information
and other privacy-preserving functions. Barth et.al., [3],
provide a comprehensive comparison of the CI frame-
work to other existing models such as Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC), the eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML), Enterprise Privacy Au-
thentication Language (EPAL), and the Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences (P3P).
RBAC. In RBAC, access control is defined in terms
of available resources and users’ roles that have
access to it. Compared to RBAC, CI is a more
generic framework that introduces additional at-
tributes, namely contexts, subjects, as well as trans-
mission principles, that capture more accurately the
different dynamics according to which information
is shared.
XACML. The eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) is a generic XML-based markup
language that allows specifying attribute-based AC
policies for resources. XACML can be used to im-
plement Attributed Base Access Control (ABAC) as
well as the RBAC scheme. We can also express the
CI framework using XACML by capturing the con-
textual and information flow semantics behind the
CI norms.
P3P. The P3P language is designed to help websites de-
scribe their privacy polices with regards to users’
data. In contrast to the CI framework, P3P is lim-
ited to policies involving only two parties, i.e., the
website and the visitor, operating in a very specific,
global context [3].
Other works based on CI. In [3] the authors pro-
posed a logical framework for reasoning about privacy
expectations and privacy practices using CI. The same
formalization of contextual has been also used in [17].
The framework uses first-order temporal logic (FOTL)
to express norms by describing the actors that partici-
pate in each context, the roles these actors play, and their
knowledge states, all at a specific point in time. While
FOTL-based formalisms can model temporal properties
related to contextual integrity, the logic itself is too ex-
pressive to serve as a suitable foundation for tools that
mechanize reasoning about privacy norms in real-world
systems. For example, the valid formulas of full FOTL
are not even recursively enumerable. Consequently, any
automated approach to reasoning about validity, respec-
tively, satisfiability of formulas in full FOTL is inherently
incomplete [2].
In [10] the authors propose computational and infor-
mation models of Implicit Contextual Integrity in a so-
cial network. The main motivation behind this work is
based on the idea that context in OSN is never explic-
itly defined and must be inferred from the information
itself. The paper introduces the notion of an Assistant
Agent which uses the defined information model to in-
fer any implicit contexts, relates them to existing norms
and stops undesirable information flows. In our work, we
rely on the users to decide on valid and relevant informa-
tion flows and contexts in the system.
Similarly, Y. Krupa and L. Vercouter [16] looked into
having an Assistant Agent be part of a Privacy as Contex-
tual Integrity for the Agent Systems (PrivaCIAS) frame-
work for open and decentralized virtual communities.
The agent is designed to assist users with preserving their
information privacy as well as detecting other users that
violate the established privacy norms. The framework is
based on a trust model where agents gossip about their
“experiences” to inform other agents of any violations as
well as provide passive feedback. The ultimate goal is
to socially exclude “bad” agents from the system. While
this work focuses on enforcing CI norms in a distributed
environment, it does not discuss how to extract the pre-
vailing set of norms in the first place. Our framework can
complement such initiatives by providing a mechanism
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for extracting CI privacy norms from the community of
users and verify their consistency.
Compliance-based approaches to PbD. Rising to the
call for PbD, numerous approaches have been invented to
map system constraints to privacy policies that are gen-
erated external to these systems. Two examples, are Sen,
et. al. in [28] and Breaux and Anton in [6]. Sen, et.
al. have developed LEGALEASE, a language with pre-
cise semantics that enables enterprises to express privacy
policies against which practices can be checked for com-
pliance. With similar goals, Breaux and Anton have pro-
posed a methodology for extracting implementable soft-
ware requirements from privacy and security regulatory
requirements expressed in legal language that is some-
times vague and ambiguous. The intention in both exam-
ples is similar to our own in that it seeks to translate pri-
vacy requirements expressed in natural language (assum-
ing this covers legal language) into formally expressed
rules that allow for compliance checking. The threat sce-
narios, however, are quite different. Further, both exam-
ples start with externally generated privacy norms, which
they seek to express in formal language.
Other uses of crowdsourcing to generate privacy
rules. One effort that is quite close in spirit to our own
is [27] which seeks to ease the burden on users when
tailoring privacy policies on mobile apps to accurately
reflect their privacy preferences. The system clusters
users according to their willingness to share information
with app providers and configures settings on future apps
based on the position in a cluster. Relevant differences
are (i) that it applies to a dyadic relationship between the
user and app provider, and (ii) it seeks to model prefer-
ences while our work aims to model social norms.
Similarly Tohn [32] has proposed the SuperEgo sys-
tem, which uses crowdsourcing to enhance location pri-
vacy management in mobile applications. SuperEgo uses
the perception of the crowd to predict the privacy prefer-
ences of an individual. The system relies on a crowd-
opinion model and a mixture of decision-making strate-
gies to classify the information as private or not. Al-
though this work is conceptually similar in that it uses
crowdsourcing to infer relevant privacy policies for the
user, it is limited to a location-based privacy context. As
noted by the author, the CI framework is more expressive
and capable of capturing privacy-rules in a range of dif-
ferent contexts.
In summary, previous contributions focused on applying
the CI framework to enforce privacy norms in different
domains. Our work builds on these efforts by captur-
ing relevant norms in a given context and then proposes
a privacy-preserving framework that efficiently encodes
them into a actionable and verifiable privacy logic.
8 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we described a framework for discovering
verifiable and actionable privacy norms in a community
of users based on the theory of contextual integrity.
We evaluated our proposed framework by conducting
an extensive survey involving more than 450 participants
and 1400 questions to derive a set of privacy norms in the
educational context. We were able to show that the Dat-
alog encoding of the derived norms enables us to auto-
matically verify the consistency of (transitive) informa-
tion flows and automatically detect logical inconsisten-
cies between individual users’ privacy expectations, on
the one hand, and the derived privacy logic, on the other
hand. Our results leave us optimistic about the feasibility
of a full-fledged information system that operates based
on the design principles of crowdsourcing, formal verifi-
cation, and contextual integrity.
Future work includes an in-depth investigation into
more elaborate approval and divergence metrics, an ex-
tension of our design to handle inter-domain privacy
rules as well as the release of a prototype system based
on privacy norms discovered using the methods we have
developed.
Looking even further into the future, our work paves
the way towards information systems that operate on a
foundation of substantive privacy rules that reflect the
rough consensus of given communities. These could
include communities across the domains of education,
health, or more general social domains. The mechanisms
we have developed for extracting, expressing, and val-
idating a set of common rules could be integrated into
such systems. By incorporating these mechanisms into
information/social systems, user feedback can be con-
tinuously elicited, which will enable a system to refresh
rules continuously to reflect evolving community norms
and standards.
References
[1] Privacy by Design Workshops. http://cra.org/ccc/
visioning/visioning-activities/2015-activities/
privacy-by-design/, 2015.
[2] ABADI, M. The power of temporal proofs. In Proceedings, Sym-
posium on Logic in Computer Science, 22-25 June 1987, Ithaca,
New York, USA (1987), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 123–130.
[3] BARTH, A., DATTA, A., MITCHELL, J. C., AND NISSENBAUM,
H. Privacy and contextual integrity: Framework and applications.
In Security and Privacy, 2006 IEEE Symposium on (2006), IEEE,
pp. 15–pp.
[4] BONATTI, P. A. Datalog for security, privacy and trust. In Data-
log (2010), pp. 21–36.
13
[5] BO¨RGER, E., GRA¨DEL, E., AND GUREVICH, Y. The classi-
cal decision problem. Springer Science &amp; Business Media,
2001.
[6] BREAUX, T. D., ANTO´N, A., ET AL. Analyzing regulatory rules
for privacy and security requirements. Software Engineering,
IEEE Transactions on 34, 1 (2008), 5–20.
[7] BREAUX, T. D., ANTO´N, A. I., AND SPAFFORD, E. H. A dis-
tributed requirements management framework for legal compli-
ance and accountability. computers &amp; security 28, 1 (2009),
8–17.
[8] CERI, S., GOTTLOB, G., AND TANCA, L. What you always
wanted to know about datalog (and never dared to ask). Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on 1, 1 (1989),
146–166.
[9] CHOWDHURY, O., GAMPE, A., NIU, J., VON RONNE, J., BEN-
NATT, J., DATTA, A., JIA, L., AND WINSBOROUGH, W. H.
Privacy promises that can be kept: A policy analysis method
with application to the hipaa privacy rule. In Proceedings of the
18th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
(2013), ACM, pp. 3–14.
[10] CRIADO, N., AND SUCH, J. M. Implicit contextual integrity in
online social networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.02493 (2015).
[11] DE MOURA, L., AND BJØRNER, N. Z3: An efficient smt solver.
In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Sys-
tems. Springer, 2008, pp. 337–340.
[12] DETREVILLE, J. Binder, a logic-based security language. In
2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, USA, May 12-15, 2002 (2002), pp. 105–113.
[13] FAGIN, R., KOLAITIS, P. G., MILLER, R. J., AND POPA, L.
Data exchange: semantics and query answering. Theor. Comput.
Sci. 336, 1 (2005), 89–124.
[14] GORDON, D. G., AND BREAUX, T. D. Comparing requirements
from multiple jurisdictions. In Requirements Engineering and
Law (RELAW), 2011 Fourth International Workshop on (2011),
IEEE, pp. 43–49.
[15] ISMAIL, Q., AHMED, T., KAPADIA, A., AND REITER, M. K.
Crowdsourced exploration of security configurations. In Pro-
ceedings of the 33rd ACM Conference on Human Factors in Com-
puting Systems (2015).
[16] KRUPA, Y., AND VERCOUTER, L. Handling privacy as contex-
tual integrity in decentralized virtual communities: The privacias
framework. Web Intelligence and Agent Systems 10, 1 (2012),
105–116.
[17] LAM, P. E., MITCHELL, J. C., AND SUNDARAM, S. A for-
malization of HIPAA for a medical messaging system. In Trust,
Privacy and Security in Digital Business, 6th International Con-
ference, TrustBus 2009, Linz, Austria, September 3-4, 2009. Pro-
ceedings (2009), pp. 73–85.
[18] LI, N., AND MITCHELL, J. C. DATALOG with constraints: A
foundation for trust management languages. In PADL (2003),
pp. 58–73.
[19] LIN, J., AMINI, S., HONG, J. I., SADEH, N., LINDQVIST, J.,
AND ZHANG, J. Expectation and purpose: understanding users’
mental models of mobile app privacy through crowdsourcing. In
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Com-
puting (2012), ACM, pp. 501–510.
[20] MADEJSKI, M., JOHNSON, M., AND BELLOVIN, S. M. A study
of privacy settings errors in an online social network. In Pervasive
Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Work-
shops), 2012 IEEE International Conference on (2012), IEEE,
pp. 340–345.
[21] MARTIN, K. Privacy notices as tabula rasa: An empirical inves-
tigation into how complying with a privacy notice is related to
meeting privacy expectations online. 1. Journal of Public Policy
& Marketing (2014).
[22] NISSENBAUM, H. Privacy in context: Technology, policy, and
the integrity of social life. Stanford Law Books, 2009.
[23] NISSENBAUM, H. A contextual approach to privacy online.
Daedalus 140, 4 (2011), 32–48.
[24] NISSENBAUM, H. Respecting context to protect privacy: Why
meaning matters. Science and engineering ethics (2015), 1–22.
[25] POSNER, R. A. Right of privacy, the. Ga. L. Rev. 12 (1977), 393.
[26] REIDENBERG, J. R., BREAUX, T., CRANOR, L. F., FRENCH,
B., GRANNIS, A., GRAVES, J. T., LIU, F., MCDONALD,
A. M., NORTON, T. B., RAMANATH, R., ET AL. Disagree-
able privacy policies: Mismatches between meaning and users’
understanding.
[27] SADEH, J. L. B. L. N., AND HONG, J. I. Modeling users’ mo-
bile app privacy preferences: Restoring usability in a sea of per-
mission settings. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS) (2014).
[28] SEN, S., GUHA, S., DATTA, A., RAJAMANI, S. K., TSAI, J.-C.,
AND WING, J. M. Bootstrapping privacy compliance in big data
systems. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on
(2014), IEEE, pp. 327–342.
[29] SEO, J., GUO, S., AND LAM, M. S. Socialite: An efficient graph
query language based on datalog. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng.
27, 7 (2015), 1824–1837.
[30] SOLOVE, D. J., ROTENBERG, M., AND SCHWARTZ, P. M. In-
formation privacy law. 2003.
[31] THE WHITE HOUSE. U.S. Department of Commerce an
White House Privacy Report. http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf, month viewed
Feb 2012.
[32] TOCH, E. Crowdsourcing privacy preferences in context-aware
applications. Personal and ubiquitous computing 18, 1 (2014),
129–141.
[33] WESTIN ALAN, F. Privacy and freedom. Atheneum. New York,
1967.
14
